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HUNGARIAN PENSION REFORM
Eugene Golant
Introduction
The world’s first state social insurance
program was created in 1889 after Emperor
William I of Germany wrote to Parliament that
“those who are disabled from work by age and
invalidity have a well-grounded claim to care
from the state.” (“The German Precedent”) This
system was designed to safeguard the relative-
ly low number of elderly people in German soci-
ety against poverty due to old age. However,
throughout the twentieth century many
European countries have instituted state pen-
sion systems that are intended to provide gen-
erous retirement income for large groups of
people. These systems are generally funded 
on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis where retire-
ment benefits for the elderly are, for the most
part, paid by taxing the current working popu-
lation. As highlighted in previous issues of
Perspectives, these PAYG schemes have increas-
ingly become unsustainable as unfavorable
demographic changes have raised the propor-
tion of elderly supported by the workforce con-
tributions. (Blair; Glassman) 
In the 1990s pension reform became a
pressing issue for Eastern European countries
moving from communism to capitalism. These
states must not only solve the funding prob-
lems caused by demographic trends, but must
also deal effectively with problems caused by
prolonged communist rule, such as the use of
retirement and pensions as a method to mask
unemployment. They must do this with fewer
resources than most Western countries and
must undergo this transition while pursuing
EU ascension and coping with the challenges
of globalization. In 1998 Hungary became the
first European post-communist nation to
restructure its state pension system. (Palacios
and Rocha, p. 1)
In this article I first describe the main
attributes of both the pre- and post-reform pen-
sion systems in Hungary. I then define the mea-
sures of a successful pension system — adequa-
cy and financial sustainability — and evaluate
the reformed pension system using these crite-
ria. Finally I draw conclusions as to the success
of the reforms, and also identify possible mea-
sures to further improve the system.
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The Hungarian Pension System: 
Pre-Reform
The Austro-Hungarian Empire was signif-
icantly influenced by Prussian values and the
policies of Bismarck. In this tradition Hungary
established a fully-funded defined-benefit state
pension system in 1929. (“Information: The
Statutory...”) However, the system collapsed as
a result of the economic devastation caused by
World War II in conjunction with a period of
hyperinflation. After the communists solidified
power in 1948, a state PAYG pension system was
introduced. Under this system, pension eligi-
bility was based on employment, and pension
levels depended on the number of years of work.
By 1970 the system had expanded to include
almost every Hungarian and encompassed sur-
vivor’s and disability benefits as well. In the
process, fiscal pressure began to build.
From 1975 until 1990, the dependency
ratio1 increased rapidly due largely to the grow-
ing proportion of women pensioners who were
allowed a lower retirement age and had a longer
life expectancy. The average replacement rate2
also increased steadily as a result of permissive
eligibility rules and generous benefits. Men
could retire at 60 and women at 55, and both
were eligible for full benefits at any age after
twenty years of contributions. These factors,
coupled with rising wages, led to a sharp
increase in pension expenditures from 3.5 per-
cent of GDP in 1970 to 10 percent of GDP in
1990, a level that clearly could not be main-
tained. (“Hungary: Health and Welfare”) 
The Hungarian Pension System:
Post-Reform
Reform of the pension system began slow-
ly in the 1990s, but the pace picked up with the
election of the Socialist Party in 1994. The
Socialist Party formed a coalition with the Free
Democrats and made it its mission to institute
a set of economic stabilization programs called
“The Bokros3 Package.” Pension reform was
viewed as a means for curbing public spending.
Finance Minister Bokros, the author of the
reforms, argued for a complete dismantlement
of the PAYG system in favor of a funded system.
However, he was overruled by others in the gov-
ernment who favored an integrated “three-pil-
lar” system of the type advocated by the World
Bank for all post-communist countries. The pil-
lars of the new state pension system would con-
sist of an unfunded PAYG pillar (I), a mandato-
ry funded pillar (II), and a voluntary funded
pillar (III). The existing PAYG system was also
overhauled in order to preserve the benefits of
those who had already earned them under the
old system.4 (Réti) In this article I discuss only
the first two pillars, and not the third pillar
which is voluntary and dependent upon indi-
viduals’ saving.
I first briefly consider the differences
between the old and the reformed PAYG sys-
tems as summarized in Table 1. As shown in
lines 2 and 3 of Table 1, eligibility criteria were
significantly tightened in the reformed PAYG
system. The number of years necessary to qual-
ify for benefits without penalty was raised.
Penalties for early retirement and benefits for
later retirement were also increased, thus min-
imizing the incentive for early retirement and
increasing the contributor base.5 The former
wage indexation6 of pension benefits was also
phased out and replaced by a “Swiss” indexa-
tion7 formula (line 4). The introduction of the
Swiss formula reduces the potential benefit paid
out because wages tend to rise more quickly
than prices in a healthy economy. Projections
1The dependency ratio is the ratio of retirees receiving
benefits to workers paying for these retirees.
2The replacement rate is the ratio of pension benefits to
income. It is commonly accepted that a replacement rate of
60 percent will allow the retiree to maintain his or her stan-
dard of living. The method used to calculate income also
determines the size of pension benefits and will be discussed
later in this article.
3Dr. Lajos Bokros was Minister of Finance from 1995
until 1996. He is responsible for imposing controversial aus-
terity measures while in office.
4Contributors had the choice of staying in the reformed
PAYG system or switching to the new mixed system. This
choice remained open until 1999, and those who switched
to the new system could switch back until 2002 after which
time the worker was permanently affiliated with a pension
system. All new employees entering the system after July
1998 were automatically enrolled in the new system. The
reformed PAYG system will be phased out completely by
about 2050 when the last of its participants has retired.
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indicate that average pensions will fall relative
to average income per capita due to the Swiss
indexation system.8 (Orban and Palotai, p. 18) 
Workers deciding to remain in the
reformed system pay a contribution rate of 
26 percent9 of their gross wages and earn a scale
rate10 of 1.65 percent per year for each year of
service (lines 1 and 6). These changes influence
the final benefit calculation on line 7 and will
result in lower payments to pensioners as com-
pared to those of the pre-reform system.
Next I turn to the new partially funded sys-
tem and its attributes, as can be seen in Table
2. Workers opting to switch to the new system
and those entering the work force for the first
time must contribute to the two mandatory pil-
lars. The first pillar has the same attributes as
the reformed PAYG system shown in Table 1.
The second pillar accounts are managed by
non-profit organizations called PPIs (private
pension institutions). These institutions may
be established by employers, by trade unions,
or by voluntary pension funds in order to accept
and invest second pillar funds. The institution
purchases annuities payable to the participat-
ing retirees. 
Workers joining the new system pay 
22 percent to the PAYG pillar and 8 percent to
the funded pillar. The PAYG pillar yields a scale
rate of 1.22 percent per year for every year of
contributions, including the years before the
switch. The scale rate is proportionally lower
than that of the pure PAYG system due to a
lower contribution rate (lines 1 and 6). 
5The contributor base is the population that is working
and paying into the system.
6Indexation is the rate at which pension benefits rise
every year in order to maintain the standard of living of the
retiree. Wage indexation bases this growth on wage growth.
This type of indexation is more generous than indexing
based on price levels (as measured by the Consumer Price
Index).
7Swiss indexation increases existing pensions at a rate
of 50 percent of average wage increase and 50 percent of
consumer price increases over the prior year.
8As part of the new tax code, pension benefits will be
taxed and indexation will occur on a gross wage basis. The
average pre-tax lifetime earnings (gross wages) will be con-
sidered in the calculation for pension base which yields a
higher average wage. Pension benefits will be taxed once
paid to the retiree. This will lower the average pension by
an estimated 10.5 percent. (Marin, Stefanits, and Tarcali)
9This table is based on a contribution rate of 8 percent
contributed by the employee and 18 percent by the employer.
10This is the percentage of average lifetime earnings to
which the worker becomes entitled for every year of work.
Table 1
Features of the PAYG Systems Compared
Unfunded Systems
Old Reformed
1 Contribution Rate 30% of gross wage 26% of gross wage
2 Normal Retirement Age 60 (men); 55 (women) 62
Low penalty rates Higher penalty rates 
3 Early Retirement Rules and a minimum of and a minimum of 
20 years of service 40 years of service
4 Indexation of Pensions
(to keep up with increases Net wage indexation Swiss indexation 
in costs of living)
5 Pension Base
Average lifetime earnings, Average lifetime earnings, 
partially indexed partially indexed
Scale Rate Varies each year; Constant 1.65% of
6 (earned per year the average is 2% gross wage per year
of contributions) of net wage per year
7 Benefit Calculation Starting pension = Starting pension =
line 5 times line 6 line 5 times line 6 
Source: Feldstein and Siebert, p. 372.
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Though the multi-pillar scheme met with
some opposition from the new government
elected only six months after its enactment in
mid-1997, it seems to have been successful in
attracting participants. Fifty percent of the
workforce has switched to the new system, and
eighty percent of all workers under the age of
thirty have switched. (Feldstein and Siebert) 
Defining a Successful Pension
In order to assess the success of the
Hungarian pension reforms, it is important to
first define the goals of a pension system and
establish metrics by which to measure the cur-
rent system. The EU has acknowledged that the
financial condition of pension systems in mem-
ber states is a common problem and has thus
attempted to define common goals and bench-
marks for all member states. The EU
Committee on Social Protection identifies ade-
quacy and financial sustainability as the cor-
nerstone features to which all member states’
systems should aspire. (Quality and Viability of
Pensions…) 
Adequacy Defined
The Hungarian National Strategy Report
on pensions as well as EUROSTAT use the “per-
cent of poverty risk” as a tool for measuring
adequacy of pension benefits. One such mea-
sure is the percentage of pensioners whose
incomes are less than 60 percent of the average
discretionary income11 of the nation. Though
this metric is useful for evaluating the general
welfare of pensioners as compared to other seg-
ments of society, it does not take into consid-
eration the source of a pensioner’s income. For
example, the elderly may be obtaining jobs in
order to stay above the poverty line. To better
measure the adequacy of the system, I consid-
er the average replacement rate and the index-
Table 2
Old PAYG System Compared to New Multi-Pillar System
Unfunded System New System
Old First Pillar (PAYG) Second Pillar (Funded)
1 Contribution Rate 30% of gross wage 22% of gross wage 8% of gross wage
2 Normal Retirement Age 60 (men); 55 (women) 62 62
Low penalty rates and Higher penalty rates
3 Early Retirement Rules a minimum of and a minimum n.a.
20 years of service of 40 years of service
4 Indexation of Pensions 
(to keep up with increases Net wage indexation Swiss indexation n.a.
in costs of living)
Average lifetime Average lifetime
5 Pension Base earnings, partially earnings, partially n.a.
indexed indexed
Scale Rate Varies each year; Constant, 1.22%
6 (earned per year the average is 2% of gross wage n.a.
of contributions) of net wage per year per year
Starting pension = Starting pension =
Annuity =
line 5 times line 6 line 5 times line 6 
Fund Deposits 
7 Benefit Calculation times Rate of 
Return minus 
Fund Fees  
Source: Feldstein and Siebert, p. 372.
11Discretionary income is income that is available to
spend after taxes have been deducted.
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ation mechanism and apply the benefit formu-
la to hypothetical retirees in order to test ade-
quacy of the pension system.
Adequacy: Pre-Reform
The average Hungarian pension in 2004
was HUF 57,251 per month, or around $280.
However, average figures take into account pen-
sions accrued under the old system; thus, in
order to fully understand the effects of the new
system, it is important to consider a pension
earned completely under the new system.
(National Strategy Report…, pp. 8–18) 
As mentioned above, the current pension
formula uses average gross lifetime earnings as
the base for pension benefits, multiplied by the
scale rate that the worker has earned. Retirees
who participate in the three-pillar system
accrue 1.22 percent of their base per year.
Participants solely in the reformed PAYG sys-
tem accrue 1.65 percent annually.12 This for-
mula applies for a person retiring at 62 years of
age or after 40 years of service. The formula
incorporates penalties for early retirees and
additional benefits for later retirees. I consider
four scenarios (Cases A through D) described
in Table 3 in order to see more clearly the impli-
cations of this new system.
The starting monthly pension (line 3)
depends on the number of years of service and
the level of average lifetime earnings. Line 6
shows the minimum subsistence level in
Hungary, which is used here as the benchmark
for determining adequacy. Line 7 shows the per-
centage of the minimum subsistence level that
is provided through the pension in each of the
four cases.
It is important to note that Case A, in
which a person has worked for 40 years and
retired at age 65, is not representative of most
Hungarians. In fact, fewer than one-half of one
percent of Hungarians who retired in 2004
retired at over 62 years of age. Rather, Case A is
included for the sake of comparison. 
Case B is much more representative of the
Hungarian population when one considers that
the average female contribution for 2004 was
32 years. Case C is also representative of a large
group; about 30 percent of contributors earned
the minimum wage in 2003. (National Strategy
Report…, Appendix 4) This is an important case
because it represents a group which is in great
danger of post-retirement poverty. Case D
shows the severe impact that a period of unem-
ployment can have on average lifetime earnings
and thus on pension benefits. Both C and D
yield a pension benefit (line 3) that is below the
poverty line13 as well as the minimum subsis-
tence level (line 6). 
A guaranteed minimum pension is pro-
vided to those who have contributed for at least
20 years. A retiree receives additional monthly
payments so that the total pension minimum
is HUF 24,000 per month. In light of the fact
that the minimum subsistence level is about
HUF 45,000 per month, this amount seems
completely inadequate. (National Strategy
Report…, pp. 9–12 and Appendix 2)14
Surprisingly, EUROSTAT reports that in
2004 the retiree poverty rate was 10 percent,
which is better than the 12 percent rate for 
the 20–64-year-old population. This can be
explained by the fact that 18 percent of total
retiree income came from work. Apparently,
retirees are often forced to supplement their
pensions. Women over 70 are the age group
that is most at risk for poverty because women
12Thus a person who has worked for 40 years would be
entitled to 48.8 percent replacement of average lifetime
earnings from the first pillar plus any earnings from the sec-
ond pillar account. Under the old PAYG system the same per-
son would be entitled to 66 percent replacement.
13The poverty line is defined as 60 percent of average net
disposable income.
14It is important to note that the above cases were con-
structed using several macroeconomic assumptions which
impact the size of the resulting benefits significantly. For
example, the rate of return earned on the funded portions is
assumed to be 2.5 percent. The Magyar Nemzeti Bank reports
that private pension funds earned a gross return of 3.9 per-
cent during the period after 1998. This translates to an aver-
age net return of 2.1 percent after fund fees. These rates are
low by European standards due largely to the highly conser-
vative nature of fund holdings and perhaps to a lack of com-
petition. The market for second pillar investment funds is
highly concentrated, with five large funds representing 80
percent of the total value. The Magyar Nemzeti Bank further
reports that, assuming fees fall from the current 6.5 percent
of contributions to 4.5 percent over the next ten years, a net
return of 3.5 percent would be required to make the three-
pillar system produce benefits equal to those received in the
reformed PAYG. (Orban and Palotai, pp. 12–14)
         
have longer expected life spans and also have
higher unemployment rates than men.
Some scholars suggest that a replacement
rate of 66 percent is the minimum replacement
rate necessary to maintain a standard of living
after retirement. Line 5 of Table 3 suggests that
a replacement rate of 66 percent can be rea-
sonably expected for Cases A, B, and D or for a
person who has contributed for close to 40
years. The table also shows that pensions will
be modestly above the minimum subsistence
level as long as the base earnings are around
the national average and the retiree has not
experienced periods of unemployment. Though
the pension system provides an adequate ben-
efit for those earning an average salary, it seems
to fail to provide adequately for workers whose
earnings are around the minimum wage for the
duration of their contribution period. It also
seems clear that the reformed pension system
tracks the economy closely and offers little
social protection from low wages or unemploy-
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Table 3*†
Projected Benefits for Hungarian Retirees
Case A Case B Case C Case D
(Retires at 65 (Retires at 60 (Retires at 62 (Retires at 60 
with 40 years with 32 years with 20 years with 40 years
contributed and contributed and contributed and contributed with
an average salary) an average minimum wage a break in
female’s salary) salary) employment,
150% average 
salary earned 
before break and 
minimum wage 
after break)
1 Pre-tax Monthly 
Earnings in 2004 HUF 154,998 HUF 121,347 HUF 53,000 HUF 53,000
2 After-tax Monthly 
Earnings in 200415 HUF 96,858 HUF 86,156 HUF 45,845 HUF 45,845
3 Monthly Pension 
in 2005 HUF 82,131 HUF 59,864 HUF 24,662
16 HUF 32,457
4 Pre-tax 
Replacement Rate 53.0 49.3 46.5 61.2
5 After-tax 
Replacement Rate 84.8 69.5 53.8 70.8
6 Minimum Subsistence 
Level17 HUF 45,000 HUF 45,000 HUF 45,000 HUF 45,000
7 % of Minimum 
Subsistence Level 182.5% 133.0% 54.8% 72.1%
Source: National Strategy Report on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions: Hungary, Appendix 4.
* The standard used by the SPC and ISG (Social Protection Committee and Interim Steering Group) assumes real income will grow at a rate of
3% per year, EuroPop projections for population growth, Ministry of Finance estimates for inflation as well as a 2.5% net effective return on
individual funds. 
† Further assumptions: GDP growth: 2.7%, wage growth: 3.0%, inflation rate: 3.0%, demographics: -.3% population growth, life expectancy
increase: from 65.1 to 76.4 (male), from 74.6 to 84.5 (female).
15This is an assumed tax rate. Hungary has two tax brack-
ets: 18 percent for up to HUF 1.5M annual earnings, 38 per-
cent for anything exceeding this amount.
16Averages are based on yearly minimum wage for 9 years
from 1997 when the averaging system was adopted.
17Defined by the CANPI (Central Administration of the
National Pension Insurance) and set at HUF 45,000 for 2003
for single retiree.
          
ment. Much like during prior regimes, retirees
still seem to be at a high risk for poverty based
on pension benefits. Moreover, projections show
that in 2050 the value of pension benefits will
fall due to Swiss indexation. 
Financial Sustainability Defined
As mentioned above, adequacy is only one
measure of a pension system’s success. I now
consider the financial sustainability of the new
system. Financial sustainability means a pen-
sion system’s ability to provide an adequate
retirement benefit for the long-term by main-
taining a balance between contributions and
benefit expenditure. Pension contributions are
paid by insured workers as well as by employ-
ers. Raising the level of employment and elim-
inating disincentives to work raise the level of
contributions and help to ensure the sustain-
ability of the system. Lowering the benefits pro-
vided by the system by adjusting the indexing
of pensions or changing the qualifying criteria
would also help to achieve sustainability, but
may violate the goal of adequacy. Increased sus-
tainability can also be attained by improving the
efficiency of pension fund management by 
cutting costs, increasing oversight, and reduc-
ing the public debt. (“Hungary: Health and
Welfare”) Sustainability can also be increased
by reducing the size of the underground econ-
omy, which results in an increase in tax con-
tributions to the system. 
When setting contribution and benefit
rates, it is important to balance the interests of
retirees, workers, and taxpayers. A successful
system must avoid large deficits which are fund-
ed from the central budget.18 But this must be
achieved while limiting both the contribution
rates of workers as well as the cost of these
plans. Unfortunately, it is currently projected
that adverse demographic changes over the
coming decades will exert increasing financial
pressure on Hungarian and other European
pension systems. (“Commission Proposes to
Formalize…”) 
Financial Sustainability: Pre-Reform
During the first half of the 1990s, the pen-
sion system came under pressure as contribu-
tions dropped rapidly and the dependency ratio
increased. Though PAYG deficits reached 1 per-
cent of GDP in 1999, some of this was attribut-
able to revenue lost from those switching to the
funded pillar; thus the pure PAYG deficit was
only around .4 percent. Table 4 illustrates that
between 1991 and 1999 revenues decreased
more quickly than expenditures, thus produc-
ing a rising fund deficit and an alarming trend.
The sharp rise in unemployment (11.5 percent
in 1993) caused by the introduction of market
economics lowered the number of contributors.
(Feldstein and Siebert, p. 378) The problem was
exasperated by increasing evasion of the
extremely high payroll tax. Insignificant penal-
ties for early retirement were used to control
105
18The Maastricht Treaty and the Sustainable Growth Pact
are the cornerstone agreements of the Euro Zone and stip-
ulate limits on member states’ total debt and yearly deficits.
The deficit may not be higher than 3 percent of GDP.
Table 4
Revenues, Expenditures, and Balance of the Hungarian PAYG System, 
1991–99 (Percent of GDP)
1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Contribution Revenues 11.0 8.9 8.4 8.3 8.2 7.8
Pension Expenditures 10.5 9.1 8.5 8.3 8.7 8.8
PAYG balance 0.5 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 –0.5 –1.0
Revenue loss to fund 
second pillar – – – – 0.3 0.6
Pure PAYG balance 0.5 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.4
Source: Feldstein and Siebert, p. 374.
        
unemployment and thus increased the number
of beneficiaries, raising the dependency ratio
from 51.4 percent in 1989 to 83.9 percent in
1996. 
The threat of large deficits, however, was
offset by a fall in benefit payouts during the
period. This fall was caused chiefly by high infla-
tion, which produced a 15 percent real wage
decrease from 1995–1996. (Feldstein and
Siebert, p. 377) Despite these mitigating fac-
tors, the fund had a deficit equal to 0.4 percent
of GDP in 1999, while longer projections pre-
dicted unmanageable deficits in the future. It
is anticipated that the PAYG system will pro-
duce a deficit equal to 2.0 percent of GDP at the
end of 2010 and will level off at about 6.5 per-
cent of GDP in 2070. (Feldstein and Siebert, 
p. 377) 
Financial Sustainability: Post-Reform
At present a significant government con-
tribution is needed to cover the Hungarian
Pension Insurance Fund deficit. In 2004 total
expenditures on pension benefits amounted to
HUF 1,925 billion, or 9.52 percent of GDP. In
order to understand the effects and future
prospects of the new system, it is important to
distinguish the separate impact of reforming
the PAYG system from that of the introduction
of the funded pillar. Figure 1 shows the impact
of the retirement age increase as well as the
change in indexation and is based on the same
macroeconomic assumptions listed in the pre-
vious section.
As shown in the figure, stricter minimum
age requirements, increased early retirement
penalties, and increased minimum contribu-
tion years necessary to retire greatly reduce
projected deficits. Reasonable projections sug-
gest an increase in the average retirement age
for men and women of two and five years,
respectively. Although a greater number of
years of work raises benefit levels, the net effect
is an average annual reduction in future deficits
of about 1.5–2.0 percent of GDP, as seen in
Figure 1. 
The addition of the Swiss indexation
method will push the reformed system (retire-
ment age increase + Swiss indexation) into sur-
plus through 2033. Figure 1 shows the surplus
peaking around 2010, which is when the
Hungarian baby boomers begin to retire. The
dependency ratio will hover around 38 percent
until 2020, when the retirement wave will add
300,000 retirees to the system, after which time
the ratio degenerates quickly. This will lead to
large expenditure growth, as well as to a return
106
Figure 1
Comparison of Deficits Generated by the Pension System as Percent of GDP
Sources: Feldstein and Siebert, p. 374. 
Solid line =  no reform, Dotted line = retirement age increase, Plotted box line = retirement age increase + Swiss indexation
     
to deficit for the PAYG system. The increase in
the retirement age is insufficient to offset these
demographic developments. 
It is hoped that the creation of the funded
system will partially offset the growing pro-
jected deficits mentioned above. The projections
in Figure 2 attempt to gauge the potential of
the funded system for managing these deficits.
(Feldstein and Siebert, p. 375) The largest item
that does not enter the PAYG system is employ-
ee contributions that members of the fully
funded system pay into their individual
accounts (8 percent of earnings). This diversion
of funds causes the larger early deficits of the
multi-pillar system reflected in Figure 2. In fact,
HUF 186 billion of the deficit is directly attrib-
utable to the loss of revenue from members of
the multi-pillar system. (National Strategy
Report…) Currently 62 percent of insurees are
part of the multi-pillar system, and when the
system matures it should contribute 25 percent
of individual retirement benefits. As the first
members (200,000 people) of the fully funded
system retire in 2022 (those who are in their
forties in the year 2000), the rate of deficit
growth from the PAYG system will begin to
decline; yet overall expenditures will continue
to grow due to the increasing dependency ratio.
By 2050 the system will cover 2.8 million
retirees and will generate an expenditure of 9.8
percent of GDP annually. The funded pillar will
contribute an estimated 2.2 percent of the over-
all expenditure.
This projection shows that the 1997
reforms have had two distinct impacts on sys-
tem expenditures and PAYG deficits funded by
the central budget. The cost-cutting measures
discussed earlier will lead to annual savings of
0.9 percent of GDP as well as to a small pension
fund surplus until 2010. Though the funded pil-
lar will cover an increasing percentage of the
costs, deficits in the unfunded pillar will con-
tinue to grow due to the loss of proportional
revenues from a decreasing number of working
age contributors.
Conclusions
The Hungarian pension reform has
undoubtedly succeeded in improving the finan-
cial sustainability of the system. Without such
changes, the system would generate very large
deficits, which would in turn create a signifi-
cant drag on the fiscal operations of the gov-
ernment. Though a crisis has been averted,
even more savings can be achieved by moving
from a retirement age of 62 years to 65, which
is the standard in most other OECD countries.
Further cost cuts can be realized by moving
from Swiss to full-price indexation. This would
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Figure 2
Pension Fund Balances Compared
Source: Feldstein and Siebert, p. 375. 
Dotted line = Pre-reform PAYG, Solid line = multi-pillar system
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cause pension benefits to fall relative to wages
and reduce the system’s obligations to retirees.
Pension adequacy, as I have shown, is
questionable at the moment. It seems clear that
a large portion of the Hungarian population will
be forced to live on pensions that are signifi-
cantly lower than the minimum subsistence
level. This is a difficult problem because the
“ideal” in pension legislation is to match pen-
sion levels to contribution levels. An obvious
improvement would be the development of
stronger and more efficient investment funds.
Hungarian funds must generate returns that
are more in line with those of other countries
using funded pensions. Increased fund compe-
tition and reinvestment of fund portfolios away
from low performance government bonds
would also help the situation. Finally, mini-
mum pension levels must be increased signifi-
cantly. Though only a very small percentage of
the population currently receives these mini-
mum payments, they are unacceptably low. The
most promising solution to the adequacy prob-
lem may be economic prosperity and the avail-
ability of higher paying jobs. 
Hungary was the first Eastern European
state to adopt widespread pension reforms. In
light of the immense economic, social, and
political pressures that affected the country
during that time of transition, it seems a great
achievement that the reforms have been imple-
mented. Hungary is now more in line with the
global ideal of matching individual’s contribu-
tions to benefits and it is closer to the EU goal
of reducing differences in pension plans of
member states. Despite these great achieve-
ments, we must acknowledge that more work
still needs to be done. In any case, it is clear that
ensuring further sustainability through deficit
cuts will be a goal in the future and ensuring
adequacy of pension benefits a major concern
for retirees and workers alike.
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